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Working with group-level data in phenomenological research: a 
modified visual matrix method 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A common criticism of phenomenological methods has been that there is 
singular focus on individual experience at the cost of broader group level 
phenomena. In contrast, psychoanalytically informed psychosocial methods 
have continued to develop novel ways of exploring group level material. A 
notable recent methodology is the visual matrix method (Froggett, Manley & 
Roy, 2014), which is an innovative methodological development that draws on 
ideas from social dreaming (Lawrence, 2003, 2005). In this article, we 
describe the development and application of a group level existential-
phenomenological method, inspired by the visual matrix method. In 
collaboration with a filmmaker we produced a film series designed to engage 
the public with research findings on ‘enduring love’.  The viewing experience 
was explored using a modified version of the visual matrix method. We 
discuss the value of this methodological development for research within the 
phenomenological tradition as well as potential tensions.  
 
Keywords: phenomenology; existentialism; group-level data; visual matrix 
method; public engagement 
 
Introduction  
 
A number of qualitative methods arguably have become over reliant on the 
semi-structured interview as a mode of data collection (Potter & Hepburn, 
2005). This is particularly acute with interpretive/hermeneutic versions of the 
phenomenological method, where the semi-structured interview is almost 
hegemonic. To a great extent this is understandable – and indeed, sensible - 
given the focus in phenomenological methodology on first person experience 
(Smith, 2004). However, whilst we can argue that the socio-cultural and 
affective will emerge through analysis of an individual’s life-world, there 
remains a general failure within the phenomenological tradition to engage with 
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material, particularly difficult to reach affective content, beyond the individual. 
By contrast, people working with psychosocial methodology informed by 
psychoanalysis have made great strides in the development of methods 
designed to work with group-level affective material. A notable example of this 
is the visual matrix method that we take here as a model for how we might 
develop a phenomenological methodology to work with group-level affective 
material.  
 
The visual matrix method is a recent and highly innovative approach to data 
collection and analysis that has been designed as a means of ‘researching 
shared experience, stimulated by sensory material’ (Froggett, Manley & Roy, 
2014: 1; see also Froggett, Manley, Roy, Prior & Doherty, 2014). It was 
initially developed as a means of evaluating the experience, rather than 
economic or environmental impact, of public art (Froggett, Manley, Roy, Prior 
& Doherty, 2014). It was derived from the approach to social dreaming 
advanced by Lawrence (2003, 2005) and is theoretically situated within the 
object-relations psychoanalytic tradition, designed to facilitate access to 
otherwise hidden material (in the terms of Bollas, 1987, the ‘unthought known’ 
dimensions of experience). As such, the visual matrix method relies on a 
process whereby a group of participants are encouraged to free-associate to 
sensory material such that imagery, visualisation and affect are given priority 
over cognition or discourse.  
 
In this article, we take our lead from one of the early existential therapists 
Medard Boss (1957) who, having originally trained in psychoanalysis, sought 
to re-imagine the practice of psychoanalysis through phenomenology. His 
work resulted in a new mode of clinical practice that honours the practicalities 
of psychoanalytic practice but theorises the material emerging between client 
and therapist in a fundamentally different manner, with a focus on manifest 
rather than latent meaning (see Langdridge, 2013). Our aim in this article is to 
follow this same path in order to re-imagine the visual matrix method through 
phenomenology rather than object-relations and Deleuzian theory in the 
service of developing a method for collecting group-level data in 
phenomenology. The foundations of the visual matrix method in social 
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dreaming (Lawrence, 2003, 2005), which is discussed further below, connect 
well with this aim. That is, the model of social dreaming proposed by 
Lawrence, with his move away from a Freudian analysis of individual psychic 
content, has much in common with the move of Boss and his development of 
existential dream analysis. In addition, some of the theoretical resources 
drawn on by Froggett et al (2015) – notably the work of Lorenzer (Lorenzer & 
Orban, 1978) and his use of hermeneutics – nicely dovetail with the aim of 
this article to take inspiration from this method to produce a method for the 
analysis of group-level affective material within the phenomenological 
tradition. 
 
It is important to note that we do not wish to set this article up in an 
oppositional stance to the original psychoanalytic formulation of the visual 
matrix method, not at all. Froggett and colleagues’ empirical work has 
generated valuable insights into a number of topics (see, for instance, Manley, 
Roy & Froggett, 2015) and if the researcher is comfortable with 
psychoanalytically informed methods then they should follow the original 
method without modification. However, our aim is to take inspiration from this 
method to devise an alternative means for the collection and analysis of 
group-level affective material within the phenomenological tradition. The aim 
herein is to build on the methodological foundations advanced by Froggett 
and colleagues at the University of Central Lancashire to produce a new 
method for research within the phenomenological tradition. Following Boss 
and his rethinking of psychoanalytic practice, we seek to retain many of the 
practical aspects of the visual matrix method as a way to collect affect rich 
group-level data but then rethink the meaning of the material generated 
through existential phenomenology.  
 
We first discuss the challenge of a group level analysis for phenomenology, 
which has traditionally been concerned with individual first person experience. 
We then provide more practical detail on the visual matrix method before we 
introduce the project we conducted. This project involved us working with an 
artist to produce a film series based on a research project on enduring 
relationships. The film series was created to explore the power of art (in the 
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form of film) as a means of engaging the public with research findings. A 
modified visual matrix was conducted as part of the evaluation strategy for the 
project. We then move on to discuss the foundations of the visual matrix 
method in social dreaming and how the matrix method can be rethought 
through phenomenological theory, particularly through work concerned with 
existential dream analysis. This rethinking of the foundations of the visual 
matrix provides the theoretical justification for developing a modified 
existential phenomenological version. Finally, we present our own analysis of 
the data produced in the evaluation of the film series, as an exemplar of how 
to conduct an existential group-level phenomenological analysis of visual 
matrix data. In the process of presenting these findings we discuss the value 
and challenge of adopting a phenomenological perspective with the visual 
matrix method as a means for collecting group level and affect saturated data.  
 
The challenge of group-level analysis in phenomenology 
 
Phenomenology is rightly most commonly identified with the work of Husserl. 
Indeed, it would be bizarre for someone to position their work as 
phenomenological without due regard to the foundational principles of the 
tradition laid out by Husserl (1954/1970). However, phenomenology does not 
begin and end with the work of Husserl (see Spiegelberg, 1994), in spite of 
continuing boundary wars to this effect. Not only has phenomenological 
philosophy been subject to continuous debate and development since Husserl 
but a number of other early figures in phenomenological philosophy – Edith 
Stein and Max Scheler, in particular - also offer radical alternative insights for 
the tradition. Much more recently, a notable contemporary development and 
application of phenomenological philosophy has been concerned with social 
cognition and questions of sociality (Szanto & Moran, 2016). That is, whilst 
phenomenology has always been concerned with first- and second-person 
(singular) experience, contemporary philosophical scholarship has been 
exploring the problems and possibilities of first- and second-person plural 
(group-level) experience.  
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Both Edith Stein and Max Scheler have been rather neglected within the 
English language tradition of phenomenology but their work, particularly when 
developed through contemporary phenomenological scholarship (e.g. Szanto, 
2015), provides the philosophical foundation for a group-level approach to 
data collection and analysis in phenomenological research methodology1. The 
present work may therefore be categorised as ‘phenomenological’ or 
‘informed by phenomenology’, depending on the reader’s adherence to 
Husserlian first philosophy and desire to enforce strict (and historically static) 
definitional limits around this philosophical and methodological tradition. It is 
not the purpose of this article to engage in such disputes or even discuss the 
philosophical underpinnings of group-level phenomenology in any detail (for 
that see AUTHOR, forthcoming). The focus of this article is to present an 
empirically grounded phenomenological development of a group-level 
methodology focused primarily on experience rather than interactional 
dynamics. Even so, it is still valuable to briefly outline some fundamental 
ideas from Stein and Scheler about phenomenology and sociality to provide 
some background theoretical context for what follows.  
 
Stein (1917/1989; 1922/1970) provides particular insight into the relationship 
between an individual and other person or group through her 
phenomenological investigations into empathy and emotional sharing (Szanto, 
2015). She describes in detail the ‘communal life-feeling’ (gemeinschaftliches 
lebensgef ühl) and role of moods (Stimmungen) in their intentional 
constitution. In spite of this shared emotion Stein argues that even when there 
is complete immersion in a group ‘we’ (plural subject) experience the 
individual remains in tact. There is no fusion or extinction of individual 
subjectivity. Nevertheless, Stein distinguishes individual and communal 
emotions in part on the basis that they have different ‘subjects of 
experiencing’ (Subjekt des Erlebens). Groups consist not only of a plurality of 
individual subjects but also – according to Stein – a ‘we’ subject of the shared 
emotion. This is not some notion of collective consciousness or singular 
shared super-ego but rather a plural subject or ‘constituted unity’ that may be 
                                                        
1 Levinas (1969, 1981, 1985) is another figure who offers considerable scope 
for the development of a social phenomenology (see Dimitrova, 2016).  
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experienced by the individual subjects that partake in the shared experience, 
the ‘communal experiential stream of experiences’.  
 
Scheler (1913/2009; see also Szanto, 2016) is even more radical and takes 
the phenomenological position a step farther with his notion of ‘group 
personhood’ (gesamtperson). Scheler argues that personhood is inherently 
(and irreducibly) social, with the ‘I’ an essential part of the ‘We’ and vice 
versa. In keeping with some existential thinkers (e.g. Buber), Scheler also 
claims that the ‘We’ predates the ‘I’. Building on this position, he further 
argues that all individuals not only experience themselves as individuals but 
also as a member of a ‘communal person’ (gesamtperson) and ultimately as a 
set of ‘group persons’. The term ‘communal person’ is used by Scheler 
because of his view that groups (especially communities) have values and it is 
only persons who bear values. Group persons as a concept therefore is not 
only epistemological or ontological but also ethical (cf. Levinas 1969, 1981, 
1985). Persons, whether individual or communal, are ontologically ‘centres of 
experiencing’ (Aktzentrum des Er-lebens), and the integration of mental and 
practical acts. In keeping with Stein, ‘communal persons’ are not a fusion of 
persons or in any real way something to be contrasted with individual 
persons. In Szanto’s (2016: 299) terms they are instead: “… complex matrices 
of different levels and depths of the social integration of intentional and 
phenomenal experiences, volitions, and actions.” They are constituted 
through ‘mutual co-experiencing’ (Miteinandererleben) with an intentional 
‘consciousness-of’ that is distinct from and independent of the 
‘consciousness-of’ of individuals.  
 
In this context, the very nature of experience must be re-thought in a group-
level analysis as the traditional phenomenological focus on individual 
accounts of lived experience become subsumed within a broader sense of 
collective mood or group personhood. This is not to say that we lose a focus 
on experience, not at all. But rather individual accounts of experience may be 
less identifiable as ‘individual lived experience descriptions’ (van Manen, 
2014), as a result of the detachment of the individual from the experience 
being recounted and distinct affective nature of communal experiencing. The 
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focus in this instance is not the individual and their concrete lived experience 
but rather group level phenomena, especially the affective (the mood), 
expressed through individuals but referencing a sense of collective or group 
personhood experience. In these terms, it is the group that ‘speaks’ or - more 
accurately - is the object of analysis, albeit always as expressed through a 
plurality of individual consciousness (cf. Schutz, 1932/1967). And it is the 
modified version of the visual matrix method described herein that we contend 
provides a means with which to gain some sense of the ‘communal 
experiential stream of experiences’, or the essence of group personhood itself 
as it relates to the intended object of the collective group experience.  
 
The visual matrix method 
 
In practical terms, the visual matrix is conducted with groups of anything from 
6-35 participants, with one facilitator per 15 members of the group. 
Participants may be selected on any criteria appropriate to the study but is 
usually on the basis of their shared experience of a sensory experience. The 
method requires that participants and the facilitator sit on chairs in a 
‘snowflake pattern’ such that they can avoid direct eye contact and speak into 
a shared space rather than to one another. The facilitator invites participants 
to express their experience in terms of ‘images, associations, thoughts and 
feelings’, without people taking turns to speak or engaging in other 
traditionally polite conversational practice. The group facilitator would 
emphasise that no judgement will be made about any contributions. The 
facilitator also models appropriate behaviour throughout such that participants 
are encouraged to maintain a mode of engagement where they talk about 
their experience and the imagery, associations and feelings, rather than 
engaging in analysis or conversation. Sessions will run for a pre-determined 
time before a short break where the chairs are rearranged into a semi-circle, 
wherein participants are encouraged to reflect on what emerged in the 
previous ‘snowflake’ session and identify clusters of imagery, thoughts and 
feelings. These themes are then mapped on a flipchart by the facilitator.  
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The theoretical foundations for the method are primarily derived from object-
relations theory, particularly the work of Bion (1970). Work from Winnicott 
(1971/2005) about potential space and play, and particularly Lorenzer’s 
(Lorenzer & Orban, 1978) notion of ‘scenic understanding’ further add to the 
theoretical foundations. These ideas are allied – in the spirit of ‘theoretical 
hybridization’ - to the Deleuzian concept of rhizomatic thinking (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1988), in an attempt to make sense of the nature of the associative 
thinking emergent in the matrix. That is, the quality of material generated in a 
matrix is of a different order to that seen in a discursively oriented group 
discussion (focus group) or – as we remark upon in this article – might be 
seen in individual interviews. The material in a matrix does not emerge in a 
linear or chronological fashion but instead flows through associations in 
moments of intensity and dispersion. Froggett et al (2015) argue therefore 
that the rhizome described by Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 21) as “… an 
acentred, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system without a General and without 
an organizing memory or central automation” might serve as an appropriate 
framework within which to situate this phenomenon. As such, data analysis is 
traditionally informed by object-relations theory within a broad Deleuzian 
psychosocial framework with the aim being to detect tacit social processes 
and emotions along with more overt material. This operates through a 
mechanism described as a ‘hermeneutic vortex’ in which successive analytic 
panels incorporate wider contextual concerns into their analysis in an effort to 
articulate the ‘unthought known’ (Bollas, 1987).  
 
The film project and evaluation methodology 
 
The impact agenda is now well established in the UK and increasingly so 
elsewhere around the World. Notwithstanding criticisms of some of the 
political imperatives driving this agenda, there is widespread acceptance of 
the need for researchers to engage in practices designed to maximise the 
impact of their work beyond academia: to engage with policy makers, 
practitioners and members of the public. The use of art in its myriad forms is 
starting to figure large as a valuable means for engaging a variety of 
audiences – particularly, the general public - with the potential for more 
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powerful impact than the written word alone (Leavy, 2015). In collaboration 
with an artist, we produced a film series based on the findings from the 
PROJECT TITLE research project on relationships (ESRC: RES XXX-XX-
XXXX). PROJECT TITLE was designed to investigate how couples sustain 
their long-term relationships, focussing on the meanings and practices of 
relationship quality and stability.  
 
The film project was designed to explore the potential of art as a means of 
engaging with a variety of publics on this topic. We gave the artist a book that 
included academic analysis of key findings (AUTHOR, 2015), and also briefed 
him in person, highlighting a number of key outcomes from the study. He then 
sought to immerse himself in the findings in order to produce his proposal for 
the film series. Through on-going dialogue, with much back and forth on 
content and form, the filmmaker produced a series of films entitled ‘Molecular 
Human’. The artist we worked with was ARTIST NAME 
(www.ARTISTNAME.com), an experienced artist who works primarily in 
producing public artworks, often using film and large-scale projections. He 
called the film series he produced for our project ‘Molecular Human’ (with the 
series available to view on the project website: www.PROJECTNAME.org). 
 
The series included 14 films, with each film in the series inspired by the 
research findings with them each representing different – though often 
overlapping - aspects of the findings. The film series was premiered at a 
launch event in The Vaults at The Royal Society of Arts House, just off The 
Strand in central London. The location provided easy access and a venue that 
was ideal for showing a film, with people able to move freely about the space 
whilst viewing the films. We decided to accompany the films at the launch with 
live music, with David McAlmont and Guy Davies devising a music set in 
liaison with ARTIST NAME. It was felt that music would facilitate an immersive 
aesthetic experience with the audience engaged in sustained focus on the 
visual material rather than in conversation. Following a very brief introduction 
about the aim of the project people were left to view the films and enjoy the 
music. 
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Our evaluation strategy involved the use of a modified visual matrix exercise 
consisting of 16 people (including the facilitator) conducted immediately after 
the presentation of the film series at a launch event in central London, along 
with 15 individual interviews conducted within 3 weeks of the event. 
Participants were a self-selecting convenience sample who responded to an 
invitation email sent out prior to the launch event and through recruitment at 
the event itself. People were asked if they were willing to take part in a group 
exercise following the viewing of the films. We decided to use interviews 
alongside the visual matrix in order to balance group-level associative data 
with individual experiential accounts, especially given the interview remains 
the normative mode of data collection within phenomenological analysis, the 
findings of which are reported elsewhere (AUTHORS, forthcoming). The 
visual matrix was designed to generate group-level data and as such we did 
not collect data on individual participant demographics. We note, however, 
that the group reflected the make up of the event audience, with it being well 
balanced for gender, age and ethnicity and reflective of the ethnically diverse 
population of London. The matrix was conducted in line with the standard 
visual matrix procedures described above.  
 
Rethinking the visual matrix method 
 
Re-imagining the dream space  
 
As mentioned previously, the theoretical and practical foundations of the 
visual matrix method have been built upon the ideas and techniques of social 
dreaming (Lawrence, 2003, 2005). Lawrence (2003) contrasts his method of 
social dreaming with the Freudian approach. He draws primarily on the work 
of Bion (1970) to provide the theoretical foundation that allows him to see 
dreams less bound to the psyche of any one individual, and instead the 
product of broader social and cultural processes. In a social dreaming matrix 
the participants will free associate such that any individual dream “sparks off 
associations among the participants that lead to the matrix becoming a multi-
verse of meaning.’ (Lawrence, 2003: 610). In addition, Lawrence conceives of 
dreams such that the discovery of individual latent meaning is no longer 
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central. Instead, he questions whether dreaming might better be understood 
as a “normal human activity” in which individuals are “capable of making their 
own interpretations”.  
 
The notion of the matrix itself, where people come together to free associate, 
drawing upon the web of social and cultural resources that surround and 
situate us, derives from the group analytic work of Foulkes (Foulkes & 
Anthony, 1957; Foulkes, 1964, 1973). As such, the matrix is that “substratum 
of feelings, thoughts and emotions that is integral to every social configuration 
and allows primordial images to appear from the social unconscious.” 
(Lawrence, 2003: 617). Affect is central here, as is the possibility for “play, in 
the sense that Winnicott (1971/2005) used the term, with the potential 
meanings of the dreams” (Lawrence, 2003: 618). There are no predetermined 
meanings imposed on a dream nor any specific theoretical apparatus 
employed in the analysis. Instead, participants ‘play’ – engage creatively – 
with the dream material as they freely associate with the emergent ideas and 
meanings.  
 
The work of Boss (1957) in reimagining the Freudian approach to dream 
analysis shares some striking similarities to that of Lawrence, even though 
they had a different agenda and came from rather different theoretical 
perspectives. That is, Boss (1957) sought to reimagine Freudian 
psychoanalytic dream work through a phenomenological lens, drawing 
principally on the thought of Heidegger (1927/1963), such that the focus is 
firmly on the manifest meaning – inflected by the social and cultural world - 
rather than individual latent content. His aim was not to develop a social 
model of dreaming but rather to develop a phenomenological approach to 
individual dream analysis that moves away from analysis of depth within an 
individual psyche towards an understanding of the person within their 
lifeworld. Scientific work on dreams offers some support for the argument of 
Boss in favour of focusing on manifest content, with evidence for the striking 
similarity between material in a person’s waking life and their dreams (Hall & 
Nordby, 1972). The key argument is how dreams must be explored as an 
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aspect of our being-in-the-world that can only be understood in relation to the 
everyday concerns of waking life. 
 
Boss (1957) developed two principles for dream analysis that draw directly on 
Heideggerian concepts: bearing and possibility. The first concerns the bearing 
of the dreamer to other persons and the wider world in a dream, which - like 
Lawrence - emphasises the way in which a dreamer is embedded in a 
culturally and historically situated relational context. The second principle 
involves exploration of possibilities in the dream that are ahead of the 
dreamer’s waking experience, so that we might identify how the dream may 
offer insight that opens up a person’s world. Unfortunately, Boss (1957) failed 
in large part to implement - and therefore demonstrate - an effective 
phenomenological method of analysis in practice, often drawing on extant 
psychoanalytic concepts and idiosyncratic notions (Gendlin, 1977; Vedfelt, 
2002).  
 
In the light of the need to implement a proper systematic phenomenological 
mode of analysis, the approach to existential dream analysis of Boss has 
been further developed by the first author (AUTHOR, 2006, 2013, in press). 
He sought to achieve this by turning to work on phenomenological research 
methodology to explicate a more systematic way to conduct a 
phenomenological dream analysis. This involves a strict phenomenological 
stance along with incorporating consideration of the dimensions (or ‘fractions’) 
of the lifeworld – self, sociality, embodiment, temporality etc. - into the analytic 
process. AUTHOR (in press) argues that dreams “…dreams offer us a 
creative play space for working through our ontic concerns.” in which client 
and therapist work together to critically interrogate the material through a 
number of existential dimensions. The aim is that the use of the existential 
dimensions will help illuminate the meaning of dream material that might 
otherwise be out of immediate awareness.  
 
It is worth clarifying what is meant here by the ‘meaning’ of material ‘out of 
immediate awareness’ within the context of a phenomenological perspective. 
The visual matrix method that provides the technique being used here to 
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generate data, and the social dreaming method upon which it is based, both 
adhere to a psychodynamic notion of the unconscious that is an anathema to 
phenomenology. Phenomenology is concerned with consciousness first and 
foremost. However, contrary to a common misconception, the 
phenomenological focus on consciousness does not mean that all of 
consciousness is necessarily available or fully meaningful to a person (strictly, 
to Dasein, in Heidegger’s terms). Heidegger (2001) argues strongly against 
any notion of an unconscious as a container into which material is inserted 
that might then re-emerge at some other time but his philosophical position 
allows for self-deception. The psychoanalyst M. Guy Thompson (2003; 2007; 
2016) is particularly helpful here in his exploration of the relationship between 
Heidegger’s thought and Freudian psychoanalysis. Thompson (2007: 147) 
explains that Heidegger is correct that ‘…there is no “unconscious”, only 
being, which is another way of saying that what is hidden from us is not the 
“content” of an unconscious portion of the mind, but rather the meaning of 
such and such a circumstance that, perhaps chronically, eludes us.’ The 
Heideggerian position further refutes any mechanical notion of cause and 
effect and associated developmental theory (the ‘why’ of psychoanalysis), 
with (unconscious) motives for human action being fundamentally 
unknowable. As an aside, Thompson (2007) notes that Heidegger and Boss 
both admired the technical principles that Freud developed and underpin all 
subsequent psychotherapeutic practice even if they disagreed with his theory. 
Heidegger is not the only phenomenological philosopher to discuss the 
unconscious of course but there is not the space here for further exposition. It 
is, however, worth mentioning how the unconscious may also be rethought, at 
least in part, through Sartre’s (2003) notion of mauvaise foi (bad faith), 
effectively a form of self-deception. Sartre’s rejection of the Freudian 
unconscious, like that of Heidegger, is often misconstrued as a rejection of 
anything that is not immediately available to consciousness when in fact it is 
actually a rejection of the reification of the unconscious as an objective entity, 
something that many contemporary psychoanalysts would agree with. In 
these existential terms, material that is not immediately or readily available to 
consciousness operates as a mode of self-deception, a deception that 
emerges through our being, the perpetual confrontation with nothingness and 
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a desire to escape anxiety, guilt and shame (Holzhey-Kunz, 2014). Dreams, 
and psychosocial methods like the visual matrix technique, may therefore be 
useful means within a phenomenological perspective for accessing this 
material that is not otherwise readily available to any individual subject.  
 
The inspiration for incorporating the dimensions of existence within dream 
analysis comes primarily from work developing phenomenological 
methodology, most particularly Ashworth (2003, 2015), though van Manen 
(1990, 2014) also suggests a similar addition to his hermeneutic 
phenomenological method. Ashworth argues for the explicit use of dimensions 
(or ‘fractions’ in his terms) of the lifeworld in order to deepen a 
phenomenological analysis. Heidegger (1927/1963) and the later Husserl 
(1954/1970) both stressed the need for experience to be understood ‘within a 
world’, which was described as the ‘lifeworld’ by Husserl.  The lifeworld 
describes any individual’s own subjective experience of day-to-day life but 
whilst it is idiosyncratic it will share certain common features with the lifeworld 
of other human beings. These common features can be found described in 
the literature of the existential phenomenological philosophers Heidegger, 
Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, De Beauvoir, and others, and may be described as 
‘dimensions’ or ‘fractions’ of the lifeworld.  
 
Existential dream analysis may similarly employ the dimensions of the 
lifeworld to better enable therapist and client to work together to make sense 
of the meaning of a dream within a broad phenomenological framework 
(AUTHOR, 2006, 2013, in press). Whilst the dimensions (or fractions) 
underpin all experience, they are not necessarily all salient within any one 
analysis. They will carry different weights with different topics and the 
phenomenological rule of equalisation is particularly valuable here in ensuring 
that we do not presume which dimension will be most apparent in our analysis 
with any particular topic.  
 
Each fraction imposes, as it were, its own “aura,” or theme, on the 
lifeworld without being detached from the other fractions. The 
whole lifeworld is mine, just as the whole lifeworld gains its 
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meaning from my sociality; the whole lifeworld is relative to my 
embodiment; the whole lifeworld is temporal and spatial; the whole 
lifeworld has its priorities and saliences which mark out the 
individual’s cares and concerns, their projects; the whole lifeworld 
bears the marks of the categories and grammatical dispositions of 
the culture and language, and the whole lifeworld, as it is lived 
through, is experienced affectively in terms of the moods which the 
entities (entities-for-me) disclose. Each fraction is essential, and 
each melds in with the others. Yet we can think each one 
separately, and view the lifeworld in its light. (Ashworth, 2016: 24) 
 
Ashworth (2016) provides detail about each concept but for those less familiar 
with them they are, in brief, as follows: 
 
• Selfhood refers to our subjective understanding of who we are, our 
sense of identity or selfhood.  
• Sociality concerns the way that human beings are fundamentally 
relational beings, with relationships at the heart of our experience of 
the world.  
• Embodiment relates to our embodied state as human beings and how 
this features in our experience, including consideration of gender, 
sexuality, ethnicity and disability.  
• Temporality refers to the way that existence is temporally structured 
such that we are always ‘living in time’, and how the sense of time 
might be phenomenologically apparent within any experience.  
• Spatiality refers to a person’s understanding of their position in the 
world through geography.  
• Project is that aspect of a situation that relates to a person’s ability to 
carry out activities which they have committed to and which they 
believe are central in their life, in other words our fundamental 
concerns.   
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• Discourse concerns the way that language structures experience and 
how our experience may be understood through particular social and 
cultural discourses. 
• Moodedness is about ‘mood as atmosphere’. That is, for every event in 
the lifeworld there will be an associated mood. We must be careful not 
to assume that this is the possession of any individual but instead to 
acknowledge mood as the broader affect accompanying the various 
situations that we encounter in daily life.  
 
The use of the dimensions must therefore be driven by the data, whether that 
data is the substance of a dream or the product of a visual matrix exercise. 
This additional analytic element is incorporated into the latter stage of a more 
traditional phenomenological analysis, whether that is through breaking down 
the text into meaning-units as we see with the work of Giorgi (2009) or into 
themes as we see with van Manen (1990), and others adopting a more 
hermeneutic approach to the analysis. Below we present an outline of the 
existential phenomenological analytic strategy we have developed, along with 
a summary of the analysis. Through this, we aim to demonstrate the value of 
a phenomenological stance engaging the existential dimensions to an 
analysis of visual matrix material.  
 
An existential phenomenological analysis of the visual matrix 
 
There are numerous phenomenological methods but we suggest that a 
hermeneutic approach is likely to be most productive for an analysis of 
material of the sort produced within a matrix exercise (e.g. van Manen, 1990, 
2014). The flexibility, freedom and creativity – inspired in large part by the 
philosophy of Gadamer - most commonly associated with these approaches 
best matches the nature of the data being collected through a visual matrix 
exercise. Hermeneutic phenomenological methods inspired by Gadamer's 
work (1975) generally provide a guide to analysis rather than a rigid set of 
rules to follow and are thus heuristic (Langdridge, 2007). The focus is on how 
language reveals different aspects of the lifeworld, within particular cultural 
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and historical limits, through a fusion of horizons between participant and 
researcher. This entails an investigation where one engages the epoché and 
moves continuously between part and whole in a hermeneutic circle in order 
to derive the thematic structure of the phenomenon. Van Manen (1990) 
describes six basic steps that we followed here: (1) Turn to the phenomenon 
and commit to it; (2) Investigate experience as lived (rather than 
conceptually); (3) Reflect on the essential themes which characterise the 
phenomenon; (4) Describe the phenomenon through writing; (5) Maintain a 
strong and oriented disciplinary relation to the phenomenon. (6) Balance the 
research context by examining parts and whole.  
 
The aim is not to translate the theoretical commitments of the visual matrix 
method into phenomenology but rather to appropriate the method and then 
rethink that method in terms of phenomenology. This does require some 
dialogue so that theoretical tensions may be resolved but not a direct 
translation of the extant (object relations and Deleuzian) theory into 
phenomenology. As such, the key theoretical matters are those which most 
directly relate to the meaning of the data collected as it exists in a particular 
form and analysis being conducted. With these limits we must therefore make 
sense of data from group free association and explain how this material might 
be analysed from a phenomenological perspective. And whilst there may be 
some productive theoretical links to be made between phenomenology, 
psychodynamic theory and Deleuzian and broader process philosophy (see, 
for instance, Manley, 2010; Thompson, 2016), that is not the primary focus of 
this work. Our aim here, as set out at the beginning of the article, is to explore 
how we might take inspiration from psychosocial work, such as that on the 
visual matrix method, to move phenomenological research beyond the 
individual. 
 
The analysis therefore eschews any exploration of phenomena beyond the 
‘what’ and ‘how’, in which an analyst adopts a hermeneutic of suspicion 
(Ricoeur, 1970) when investigating ‘why’ such material might occur. The focus 
is firmly centred on a phenomenological analysis of the manifest meaning 
captured in the transcript and flipchart record of the visual matrix event. In 
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addition, such an analysis may draw on the dimensions of the lifeworld to 
further enrich the analysis, as we do here. Our own phenomenological 
analysis of the visual matrix, and particularly the individual interviews, is 
reported in detail elsewhere (AUTHORS, forthcoming) but we summarise the 
analysis of the visual matrix here, as that is the primary concern of this article, 
before moving on to discuss the use of existential dimensions designed to 
further deepen the phenomenological analysis. The theoretical and practical 
process of phenomenological analysis adopted herein - our phenomenological 
alternative to the ‘rhizomatic’ method of Frogget et al., (2014, 2015) - for an 
analysis of group-level material was as follows: 
 
(1) Each person in the visual matrix is the locus of their own experiential 
process in line with Husserl (1954/1970) and clarified in Schutz (1932/1967). 
They view the material and thus act as a centre of phenomenological 
experience. That experience is ontologically singular but ontically collective in 
the terms of the natural attitude. Whilst every participant is a singular 
experiencing being, the data collection process outlined in (2) below frames 
the type of material produced, especially in the context of the subject not 
necessarily having complete knowledge of their own subjectivity.  
 
(2) Participation in the visual matrix encourages an imaginative group process 
in which imagery and affect are prioritised, along with a sense of group 
reverie. This qualitatively alters the type of phenomenological material 
produced such that we gain access to material that is less readily available to 
or anchored within individual personal history. We know from experience, 
theoretical argument and empirical literature that we gain somewhat different 
data from individual interviews, couple interviews and focus groups (e.g. 
Potter & Hepburn, 2005). We also know that we get different data from focus 
groups and visual matrix groups (Froggett et al, 2015).  
 
(3) The visual matrix data collection process is aligned with the notions of 
empathy of Stein (1917/1989; 1922/1970) and of the group person of Scheler 
(1913/2009; see also Szanto, 2016), along with material that might be less 
readily available to individual subjects (e.g. material subject to self-deception 
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in Sartrean terms or in Heidegger’s terms our own relationship to our being). 
That is, we are seeking to encourage the production of material that is not so 
readily available to articulation by an individual through the use of the visual 
matrix method as well as material that is more inherently intersubjective.  
 
(4) Data are collected by the facilitator and through recording of the visual 
matrix exercise. This data can then be subject to a phenomenological analysis 
in which the ‘ownness’ of the experience of the material is returned to a single 
individual in the usual phenomenological manner. The data represent 
something of the natural attitude of this particular group of people giving voice 
to their collective experience of the initial prompt material. In order to make 
sense of this material we must engage the epoché and reduction as we would 
with data from an individual’s experience, setting aside our own individual 
natural attitude in the process (Husserl, 1954/1970). The difference here is 
that we do not have the usual initial sense making process of the individual 
centre stage but instead some version of group personhood and empathic 
shared experience. We gain access to the essence of an empathic shared 
experience and/or a sense of group personhood, a neglected aspect of 
experience within traditional phenomenological research in psychology.  
 
The phenomenological analysis of the visual matrix exercise revealed a 
fascinating picture of affect in which images and sensations flowed across a 
number of domains. The analysis focused on the transcript of the matrix 
exercise itself and also the summary discussion at the end of the matrix that 
took place where dominant themes are written on a flipchart (see Figure 1), 
and was conducted by the first author. 
 
_________________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
_________________________________ 
 
The core group concerns expressed through the visual matrix exercise, 
reported in AUTHORS (forthcoming), were as follows: 
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There was talk of temporality, objects and relationships enduring 
over time, including the potential for positive change even in the 
context of social and emotional precarity. The theme of embodied 
touch figured large in the social imagination of the matrix. This was 
connected to images of bodies engaged in dance, the ritualistic 
making of cups of tea or in some other everyday act of domesticity. 
This evoked feelings of comfort and familiarity, trust, intimacy, and 
desire alongside separateness and suspicion about the potential 
sinister and/or unspoken content. Talk circled around the notions of 
difference and sameness, conflict versus harmony, the real versus 
the fictional, and narrative drama versus the poetic snapshot. 
People adopted either side of these polarised positions whilst 
others resisted or opposed them. Questions of technology and the 
material world mediating interpersonal connections were raised 
and inflected by generational difference, alongside concerns about 
filmic cliché and representation of the banal. People felt privileged 
to witness the intimate lives of others and identified with stories of 
intimacy, bonding, and struggle, whilst others craved more ‘edgy’ 
and obvious signs of argument, conflict and anger.  
 
The existential dimensions of the visual matrix 
 
A number of existential dimensions emerged as particularly significant in the 
analysis of the visual matrix material, including: sociality, embodiment, 
moodedness, and spatiality. Each of them helped focus attention on 
underlying aspects of the group experience of viewing the film series and the 
audience engagement. As mentioned above, whilst they may be discussed 
separately in theoretical terms they are not necessarily separable in empirical 
terms and, as such, are discussed in relation to each other below.  
 
As one might expect, empathic sociality figured prominently in the visual 
matrix (Stein, 1917/1989). The focus of the film series was on enduring 
relationships and discussion of various aspects of relationships was central in 
the matrix. When issues of embodiment were invoked they were inevitably – 
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and perhaps not unexpectedly – also intertwined with sociality. That is, bodies 
were rarely discussed through the lens of any one individual body but much 
more as ‘bodies-in-relation’ with social relations similarly described in deeply 
embodied terms. A central and highly pertinent motif mentioned repeatedly 
throughout the matrix was that of hands touching. 
 
Very strong image for me that ran through most of the films, that 
kept coming back to me, was the hands touching each other, 
hands reaching out across space and making contact with each 
other, and that seemed to connect an awful lot of the different ideas 
and concepts of the films together for me, that repeated motif of 
touch and contact in relationships, that resonated very strongly. 
 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962; 1964/1968) uses the notion of touching hands 
himself in his philosophy of embodiment. Merleau-Ponty’s entire philosophy 
implicates the body through his notion of the body-subject and the way that all 
subjectivity (or selfhood) must be understood through our embodied being-in-
the-world. That is, he based many of his arguments against the pervasive 
dualisms of the day (mind-body; self-world; inside-outside) on a 
phenomenology of embodiment. For Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) our bodies 
are not objects that can be separated from consciousness, the world only 
makes sense through our embodied perception of the world. However, it is in 
his last and tantalisingly unfinished work Visible and Invisible (Merleau-Ponty, 
1964/1968) where touching hands figure centrally. In this work, Merleau-Ponty 
(1964/1968: 136) seeks to fundamentally question body-world dualism 
through his notion of flesh:  
 
… the world is at the heart of our flesh … once a body-world 
relationship is recognised, there is a ramification of the world and a 
correspondence between its inside and my outside and my inside 
and its outside.  
 
He uses the example of touching hands to demonstrate the double 
belongingness described above. If we touch our left hand with our right hand 
  22 
when one hand is touching then the other is touched and vice versa. The 
experience of touch is not reducible to one hand or the other with a double 
belongness represented through his notion of chiasm (from ‘chiasma’, the 
crossing over of two structures). That is, there is an inextricable relationship 
between body and world, with each folded into the other, with subjectivity 
located in this chiasm of touching and being touched (see Figure 2).  
 
_________________ 
Insert Figure 2 here 
_________________ 
 
Participants in the visual matrix explored the chiasm of flesh that is inherent to 
subjectivity and sociality through a variety of tropes, notably through the 
notion of touching. This was, at times, mediated by the material (spatial) world 
of objects whether a glass shower screen or technology. 
 
And for me the hands and that was almost a yearning to be 
touched, to be very connected with someone. And so when I saw 
the screen between them, it came as, I could see quite a can never 
quite meet, and yet put them down, kind of pretty well the same. I 
know there is, there seemed to be, I think that kind of for me sense 
of the alienation that you kind of feel a lot of the time, social media 
and yet there’s a huge gulf between us in some ways.  
 
Intimacy was expressed in the matrix in two registers: intimacy between the 
people within the film series and intimacy between members of the audience. 
With both, mood - or attunement in Heidegger’s (1927/1962) terms - was 
critical to the meaning being expressed. Heidegger (1927/1962) argues that 
all experience is through the mood of Dasein (the ‘there of being’, his notion of 
subjectivity) and in the matrix this operated at two levels. There was 
exploration of mood within the filmic material and also mood within the 
audience, with them connecting at times and not others. People were swept 
up in the mood, carried along in the flow, or detached from their experiential 
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present as a result of it, suddenly conscious of their position in space in 
relation to the ‘Others’ in the films.  
 
I thought there was a sort of wistfulness of them, just a mood that 
went through them, like all those relationships, there’s a sort of … 
not sadness … but sort of … gentleness, air of loss or something, it 
seemed. 
 
It was funny watching the intimacy, talking about something very 
intimate, it felt like sort of … not quite voyeuristic but like watching 
and being in a room with people where you have no sense of 
couple-dom at all, and yet you’re watching couples (apart from the 
threesome) so you’re watching these couples and yet collectively in 
a whole load of people there’s no sense of couple-dom at all 
around me, and that’s, that felt a bit … I was conscious of that 
somehow. 
 
Speaking of people in the room, I did see some smiles of people … 
same-sex rel… people in same-sex relationships being intimate, 
and watching same-sex and feeling, feeling the joy of it 
 
The sense and importance of ‘Otherness’ as a key constituent of sociality 
emerged at times within the matrix, albeit in somewhat different form to the 
individual interviews. In the individual interviews many participants were 
preoccupied with the machinery of film production and technical decisions 
about representation and diversity. Whilst there was some similar talk in the 
matrix this was minimised by the associative format and instead there was an 
opportunity to express the sense of jouissance (joy) (see Figure 3) that may 
emerge through a face-to-face encounter with Otherness (Levinas, 1969).  
 
_________________ 
Insert Figure 3 here 
_________________ 
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That is, the asymmetry inherent in the ‘call of the other’ (Levinas, 1969, 1981, 
1985) offers up the possibility of an ethical engagement in which one’s own 
selfhood is radically transformed (Krycka, 2015). An encounter with Otherness 
is at the heart of sociality for Levinas (1969, 1982, 1985), with Otherness itself 
critical for awareness of one’s own ethical responsibility, one’s own 
subjectivity. The first precondition for learning, for engaging more ethically in 
the world – in these terms – is the presence of the Other as teacher.  
 
I was relieved to see some different cultures. I felt that there were 
some rare moments of actually … where the lady was removing 
her scarf I felt it was such an intimate moment, the lady removing 
her scarf which is something I don’t ordinarily see, and another 
aspect was that I had anticipation that something more, that there 
was going to be some … it was gonna escalate, and it didn’t, and I 
just felt left with a … a kind of surprise with myself, that I’m so used 
to seeing things escalate into more, and that it’s actually so great to 
see intimacy in, just for a few moments of intimacy and for it to be 
safe through those films, and how rare and precious that was. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article has made a theoretical case for how we might take inspiration 
from the visual matrix method to work with group-level material within an 
(existential) phenomenological perspective. The foundation of the visual 
matrix method in social dreaming, offers useful parallels to the (existential) 
phenomenological approach to dream analysis in the move away from an 
analysis of individual psychic content towards an analysis of manifest content 
(the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of experience). The visual matrix method has proven 
valuable in generating more affect-laden and group-level data than produced 
through individual interviews or focus groups and so provides a particularly 
useful method for the production of data beyond the individual. This article 
has shown how it is possible to rethink a (psychodynamic) psychosocial 
method through the theory and methodology of phenomenological 
psychology.  
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Our analysis brought many aspects of the phenomenological experience into 
sharp focus across the dimensions of sociality, embodiment, moodedness 
and spatiality. By incorporating the existential dimensions, as proposed in 
some phenomenological methods (Ashworth, 2015; van Manen, 1990, 2014) 
and utilised in dream analysis by AUTHOR (2006, 2013, in press), we have 
shown how it is possible to work with group-level data from a 
phenomenological perspective. Our findings have shown how the dimensions 
intertwine as participants associate to the film material in the matrix. Their 
affective engagement was inflected with notions of an empathic embodied 
relationality, expressed most vividly through the trope of touching hands, and 
subjectivity being brought into focus through Otherness. That is, the matrix 
expressed a group-level concern with sociality in which the call of the 
(asymmetric) ‘Other’ acts as a teacher by confronting us with an awareness of 
our own subjectivity. This relationality was also perceived to be mediated 
through the material world, whether through a plate of glass or an iPad 
screen, with participants struggling with and then determining that this 
material mediation need not diminish the potency of our embodied intimate 
relating.   
 
It is worth noting that there were some interesting similarities and differences 
in the material generated by the visual matrix exercise when compared with 
the individual interviews. A central theme of the individual interviews 
concerned the sense of identification, in a variety of forms (character, 
narrative, and apparatus) with the material (AUTHORS, forthcoming). 
Identification is of course an aspect of subjectivity and this was almost 
completely absent in the visual matrix. Identification and other matters of 
subjectivity are in many ways individual ontic concerns and so not necessarily 
the material to expect from a visual matrix designed to facilitate group level 
association. Other key concerns that emerged in the individual interviews 
were whether the films were ‘real’ or fictional representations and issues of 
diversity (AUTHORS, forthcoming). This exercised a number of the 
interviewees and whilst the topics were touched upon in the visual matrix they 
were not dwelt on for any length of time. As we hoped, the visual matrix itself 
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resisted any individual working through of more cognitive matters about the 
process of filmmaking. In contrast, the key dimensions within the visual matrix 
were those concerned with embodiment, sociality and mood, with all three 
inevitably linked with the other. The visual material presented in the film series 
are of course inherently relational phenomena and so were more likely to 
emerge within the relational context of the visual matrix but it is still interesting 
and also reassuring to note how the visual matrix encouraged the production 
of more group-level and affect-oriented data than we saw in the individual 
interviews.   
    
Finally, we should note how this novel approach provides us with a way to 
move away from a focus on the individual within phenomenological 
methodology. This is not uncontroversial, as many phenomenologists would – 
with good reason – argue that this approach is not phenomenological at all. It 
is quite true that the methodology described herein does not fit within a classic 
Husserlian understanding of phenomenology. It pushes the boundaries of 
phenomenology very far and some might think too far. As mentioned above, 
our aim here is not to fight over these definitional boundaries but rather to 
think through how we might be able to move beyond a focus only on individual 
consciousness to explore group-level phenomena, particularly affective (mood 
oriented) material, within a broad phenomenological perspective. If this must 
be described as ‘informed by phenomenology’ rather than a (social) group-
level phenomenological method then so be it. The important thing is that we 
find ways to gather data that honour experience, whether of one individual or 
a collective and it’s mood. Beyond the theoretical focus on individual 
experience, phenomenological methods have also been over reliant on semi-
structured interviews as the primary means for data collection (Langdridge, 
2007). Indeed, semi-structured interviews have become almost hegemonic as 
a means of data collection amongst many of the most popular interpretive 
phenomenological methods. The modified visual matrix described herein by 
contrast produces group level data that we have demonstrated can be subject 
to an existential phenomenological analysis, such that we may better grasp 
group-level experience as it relates to an object of study. As such, the 
existential-phenomenological development of the visual matrix method 
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described herein opens up new possibilities for more group oriented 
phenomenological research within the human sciences.  
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